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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the asymmetric market valuation of both negative and positive 
special items as explained by accounting conservatism. I argue that special items, also 
known as nonrecurring operating gains and losses, have asymmetric market valuations, as 
tested using earning response coefficients (ERC). I believe that this difference in ERC 
between positive and negative special items can be explained by accounting 
conservatism. This thesis has two main findings: (1) an asymmetry exists in the 
valuation of positive and negative special items; and (2) the asymmetry can be explained 
by the idea of accounting conservatism, which is the tendency that firms report economic 
losses on a timelier basis than economic gains. The above two findings are supported by 
my empirical tests, which show that negative special items are more value relevant (i.e. 
have a higher ERC) than positive ones due to the fact that nonrecurring losses are 
impounded in earnings much quicker than nonrecurring gains. Thus, negative and 
positive special items are not valued equally by investors - an asymmetry exists. 
Furthermore, as the level of conservatism increases within a firm, this asymmetry of 
market valuation becomes larger, signifying that the value relevance of negative special 
items increases at a rate greater than that of positive special items. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of the value relevance of special items to investors has been an area of much 
debate over the last few decades (Black et al., 2000; Cready et al., 2010; Elliott and 
Hanna, 1996; Francis et al., 1996). However, there has been no existing literature that 
connects the value relevance of special items and accounting conservatism. This research 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the market valuation of special 
items on the income statement and its relation with accounting conservatism. More 
specifically, I provide empirical evidence that the market valuation multiples of positive 
and negative special items are asymmetric and offer an explanation of this phenomenon 
based on accounting conservatism. As a result of my study, I find that positive special 
items, which are special accounting gains, have a valuation coefficient not significantly 
different from zero, as measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), while 
negative special items, which are special accounting charges, have a significantly higher 
valuation coefficient, as measured by ERC. This empirical finding led me to consider 
accounting conservatism as a potential explanation for the asymmetric valuation 
coefficients on positive and negative special items, as accounting conservatism has the 
tendency to delay the recognition of good economic news but accelerate the recognition of 
bad economic news. 
Special items have been investigated in the accounting literature from a variety of 
perspectives. The research paper by Elliott and Hanna (1996) investigates the nature and 
the impact of special items on stock prices. According to Elliott and Hanna (1996, 135) 
special items are defined as large nonrecurring or unusual charges, both positive and 
negative, arising from the firm's earnings from continuing operations. This definition, 
which excludes income from discontinued operations and extraordinary items, has been 
adopted by the subsequent literature. After Elliott and Hanna (1996), additional research 
has shown significant interest in researching special items, partly driven by the fact that 
the frequency of special items reported in financial statements has increased dramatically 
in the last fifty years (Black et al., 2000; Cready et al., 201 O; Elliott and Hanna, 1996; 
Francis et al., 1996). 
Much of the literature on special items has been trying to understand the nature of 
special items and how different types of special items are valued differently by investors. 
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For example, Elliott and Hanna (1996), one of the first studies on special items, 
investigates the earnings response coefficient of special items in relation to the reporting 
frequency. They find that special items have a lower valuation coefficient when the firm 
frequently reports special items. This result is independently confirmed by Black et al. 
(2000) in their study which uses stock price level as the main dependent variable as 
opposed to the abnormal stock returns used by Elliot and Hanna (1996). In contrast, 
Cready et al. (2010), addressing almost the same research topic using a different kind of 
empirical design, find the opposite result to that reported by Elliott and Hanna (1996) and 
Black et al (2000). In particular, Cready et al. show that the firm has a higher valuation 
coefficient on special items when its frequency of reporting special items increases. Thus, 
this matter is not fully settled and conflicting results still exist in the accounting literature. 
Another study by Francis et al. (1996) separates special items into different categories, 
such as restructuring charges, gains/losses on sale of assets, impairment charges, etc., and 
they discover that investors value different categories of special items differently. 
However, little research to date has linked the value relevance of special items with 
accounting conservatism, which, according to Basu ( 1997), Penman and Zhang (2002) and 
Watts (2003a), is one of the longest and most prevailing principles in accounting. In the 
accounting literature, accounting conservatism is commonly interpreted as the timely 
reporting of economic losses and the delayed recognition of economic gains (Basu, 1997; 
Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Khan and Watts, 2009; Penman and 
Zhang, 2002; Watts, 2003a; Watts, 2003b). This concept of accounting conservatism is 
also known as "conditional" conservatism according to Beaver and Ryan (2000) 1• This 
concept indicates that firms require a lower verification threshold on reporting losses than 
gains, thus increasing the timeliness of the reported losses and decreasing the timeliness of 
reported gains. Additionally, Basu (1997) reports that the persistence of gains is 
significantly greater than the persistence of losses due to the fact that losses are generally 
1 Conditional conservatism is defined at news-dependent conservatism which means that whether the 
news is considered "good" or "bad" is the cause of the asymmetrical valuation of different accounting items 
(Wang et al. , 2009). However, unconditional conservatism is considered news-independent conservatism 
It was Beaver and Ryan's (2000) theory that unconditional conservatism should be measured using 
Basu's ( 1 997) asymmetrical timel iness model and conditional conservatism should be measured using 
market-to-book. 
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transitory and have little to no effect on future cash flows whereas gains have been shown 
to have a much more persistent effect on future earnings (Watts, 2003b ). 
Despite the importance of accounting conservatism, the value relevance literature has 
rarely incorporated accounting conservatism into its research agenda. For example, 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) criticizes value relevance literature, partially on the ground 
that the value relevance research ignores accounting conservatism. However, because 
there is nothing in the value relevance literature that is fundamentally and conceptually 
inconsistent with accounting conservatism, researchers should theoretically be able to 
accommodate accounting conservatism in value relevance studies. As Barth et al. (2001) 
note, 
"Value relevance studies can accommodate conservatism, and can be used to study 
the implications of conservatism for the relation between accounting amounts and 
equity values. In fact, value relevance research is a basis for establishing that some 
financial accounting practices are perceived by equity investors as conservative. " 
(Barth et al., 2000, p. 78) 
I agree with Barth et al. (2001) in that the conservatism and value relevance literature 
are not irreconcilable, and that the value relevance literature is able to accommodate 
conservatism. In particular, I attempt to incorporate accounting conservatism in the 
particular research area of the value relevance of special items. The next two paragraphs 
outline the key argument of this paper. 
The central tenet of this paper is that accounting conservatism causes an asymmetry 
between the market valuation of positive and negative special items. In particular, positive 
special items have a lower market valuation (as estimated by ERC), while negative special 
items have a higher market valuation (as estimated by ERC). The reason is the following: 
due to accounting conservatism, good economic news is impounded in stock prices much 
quicker than can be reflected in earnings. Therefore, when a firm reports certain good 
news as a positive special item in the income statement, the stock price of the firm has 
already incorporated that good news in previous periods. In other words, positive special 
items are much delayed recognitions of some past good news. Hence, positive special 
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items should theoretically have very little relevance to stockholders in the current period 
as the same news has already been absorbed by stock prices an earlier period. Conversely, 
certain bad economic news is likely reflected in both stock prices and earnings as a 
negative special item in the same period because accounting conservatism means bad 
news is recognized much faster than good news. This implies that the earnings response 
coefficient for the negative special item is positive and more significant than positive 
special items. 
In addition, positive special items have little information content to investors, and thus 
little value relevance, because substantial time have elapsed between the original event 
and its reporting in earnings, which gives investors ample opportunities to obtain the same 
information regarding that event from other non-earnings sources, such as management 
voluntary disclosures, analyst reports and sometimes, insiders. In contrast, for bad news, 
the time interval between the original event and its inclusion in earnings are relatively 
short, which means that investors would have fewer opportunities of obtaining sufficient 
information regarding the even from other sources. In this situation, the earnings release 
would provide investors a lot of useful information about the economic event and 
investors will adjust the stock price accordingly. Hence, it is contended from an 
information content perspective that positive special items have lower value relevance 
than negative special items. 
To date, few empirical studies in the value relevance literature have incorporated 
accounting conservatism. An exception is the forthcoming study by Balachandran and 
Mohanram (2011 ), who argue that increased level of conservatism does not yield any 
change in the value relevance of earnings. Because Balachandran and Mohanram (2011) 
do not find any empirical evidence to support their argument that increased level of 
conservatism within a firm leads to any change in the value relevance of the firm's 
accounting information, the authors conclude that accounting conservatism and value 
relevance appears to be unrelated. 
This study, however, finds the opposite empirical evidence to that of Balachandran 
and Mohanram (2011) by investigating specifically special items in the income statement. 
The finding shows that when accounting conservatism increases, the value relevance of 
positive special items decreases to a point of irrelevance, but the value relevance of 
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negative special items increases, as predicted. In my opinion, the difference between my 
empirical result and that of Balachandran and Mohanran (2011) is likely cause by two 
factors: First, Balachandran and Mohanran's  study examines the value relevance of total 
earnings, which include many income and expense items. Some earnings items are more 
sensitive to accounting conservatism while some others are not. Therefore, Balachandran 
and Mohanram's general earnings test may not have sufficient statistical power to detect 
the subtle relationship between conservatism and value relevance. My research, instead, 
focuses on one particular type of earnings alone - special items - which as I argue later is 
quite sensitive to accounting conservatism. By focusing on special items, this study is able 
to detect a significant association between accounting conservatism and value relevance of 
special items. Second, the proxies for value relevance are different between these two 
papers. Balachandran and Mohanran (2011) utilize mainly R squared as a proxy for value 
relevance, while my paper applies earnings response coefficient (ERC) as a proxy for 
value relevance. This difference is, of course, a matter of the researcher's subjective 
choice, as both the R squared and the ERC are extensively used in the value relevance 
literature. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into seven sections. Section 2 offers a quick 
review of the literature on the value relevance of special items and the literature on 
accounting conservatism. Section 3 develops my hypotheses. Section 4 describes my 
sample data and specific calculations of data items. The empirical tests and results are 
discussed in section 5. In section 6, I discuss the merits and drawbacks of an alternative 
explanation for my empirical finding and avenues for future research. And finally, section 
7 contains the conclusion and limitations of this thesis. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Literature on the value relevance of special items 
Starting from Elliott and Hanna (1996), a number of empirical studies have explored 
the effect of nonrecurring gains and losses on firm returns. In particular, researchers have 
examined the value relevance of seemingly transitory, special items on the income 
statement to investors. It is theoretically hypothesized that special items should have 
limited value relevance to investor due to their largely transitory nature. But the empirical 
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findings are not as clear-cut and there has been some controversy as to the direction and 
magnitude of the value relevance of different types of special items. 
Elliott and Hanna (1996) suggest that special items in general have lower value­
relevance than ordinary operating items because of their transitory nature. This is 
supported by their empirical finding that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for 
special items is lower than that of earnings from normal operations. Their second 
argument states that as the frequency of special items increases, the value relevance of a 
firm's  special items further decrease. Their second argument can be interpreted as 
investors expect certain firms to report special items in consecutive quarters, such as the 
result of implementing a restructuring strategy over a period of time. Hence, investors 
would have anticipated further special items in future quarters and priced the entire 
restructuring strategy in the first quarter. As a result, subsequent quarters' special items 
would generate lower price reactions than the initial quarters that reported special items. 
However, Cready et al. (2010) find that the value relevance of special items increases 
as the frequency of special items increases, which directly contradicts Elliott and Hanna's 
findings. Using a different research design, Cready et al. (2010) suggest that investors 
value special items more as ordinary business operations when special items have a higher 
frequency of occurrence. Cready et al. (2010) focus on the market valuation and frequency 
of nonrecurring items that are classified as transitory on a firm's income statement. They 
find that, on average, infrequently reported special items have generally low value 
relevance in the market because they are viewed as transitory gains and losses. Special 
items become an issue, however, when special items that are transitory in theory are in 
fact recurring. Cready et al. (2010) state two particular reasons as to why nonrecurring 
specialty items may occur frequently and become less transitory in firms: (1) the operating 
environment of the firm may impact its decision to classify expenses as transitory (2) 
management is misclassifying the expenses depending on their threshold of materiality as 
stated by their aggressive or conservative reporting methods. It can be assumed that there 
are industries where multiple nonrecurring expenses may be the norm. To test for the 
operating environment of a firm and its correlation with reoccurring special expense items, 
their research design includes a multitude of control variables to test for strong 
relationships between certain firm classifications and an increase or decrease in the 
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number of special items, thus increasing the robustness of the research design. Secondly, 
by narrowing the focus of the investigation to reoccurring expenses to "restructuring," 
which are highly discretionary in nature, the effect of management manipulation of 
earnings can be more easily evaluated. 
In order to determine if multiple occurrences of special items are more or less relevant 
than single occurrences, the study by Black et al. (2000) investigates both trends of 
reporting and determines that multiple occurrences of nonrecurring items and single­
reported charges are valuable to investors. However, single occurrence special items are 
both relevant and positively correlated to market value. Multiple occurrences, however, 
are also shown to be value relevant, but indicative of poor firm performance and financial 
instability, thus indicating the negative market value of multiple occurrences of special 
items. 
Black et al.' s (2010) findings are consistent with those of Elliott and Hanna (1996), 
indicating that multiple prior special items have a negative effect on the earnings response 
coefficient of earnings. The former research, however, argues that if multiple past 
occurrences are the trend for a certain company then their most recent special item, either 
negative or positive, will have a negative impact on the firm's current stock return due to 
the market discounting the discretionary write-offs. 
Francis et al. ( 1996) explore the causes and effects of special items, specifically those 
charges involving the impairment of assets. Their research investigates two main points: 
what factors indicate a firm's decision to report special items and how the market reacts to 
the announcement of a write-off. Their research was conducted before the implementation 
of SFAS No. 121, which specified guidelines for reporting special items, and therefore 
their research focuses on mainly discretionary special items. Without valid regulation on 
reporting nonrecurring gains and losses, the concept of management incentives to declare 
write-offs is investigated as a cause of reporting special items. 
The research by Francis et al. (1996) is unique in that they separate special items into 
different categories based on classification to test for different investor reactions. They 
found that inventory charges, which are generally mandatory, are viewed as a negative 
signal of future firm performance whereas goodwill impairment and restructuring charges 
have positive market reaction because they are thought to indicate an increase in future 
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economic performance. Additionally, Francis et al. (1996) conclude that the magnitude of 
the write-off increases along with historical industry trends, firm size, and a recent change 
in management. Additionally, poor past market performance was identified as another 
variable that increases the size of special items. 
One way my research differs from Francis et al. ( 1996) is that I investigate the market 
reaction of nonrecurring special items separated into positive gains and negative losses 
and investigate their difference in market valuation. In comparison, Francis et al. (1996) 
investigates only negative special items - assets write-downs in particular - and ignores 
the nonrecurring gains. 
2.2 Literature Review-Accounting Conservatism 
Accounting conservatism has been the subject of intensive research in the last twenty 
years. The classic definition of accounting conservatism is: "anticipate no profits but 
anticipate all losses" (Bliss, 1924). Basu (1997) interprets conservatism as accountants' 
tendency to require higher degrees of verification for the recognition of gains than losses 
in accounting. Basu observes that because the verification standards are higher for good 
news than bad news, bad news is more timely reflected in earnings than good news. In 
addition, Basu (1997) reports that negative earnings are less persistent than positive 
earnmgs. 
Using the asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure of conservatism, also known as 
the Basu (1997) measure, Basu (1997) shows that over the last fifty years the level of 
accounting conservatism has increased. Basu (1997) argues that one reason behind this 
trend is the increase in corporate and auditor legal liability and litigation risk in the last 
few decades. 
The four theoretical explanations for accounting conservatism summarized by Watts 
(2003a) are as follows: (1) contracting explanation, (2) litigation risk explanation (3) tax 
incentive explanation, and (4) political cost explanation. One of the oldest justifications 
for accounting conservatism is contracting theory including both debt contract dividend 
constraint and compensation agreements between parties. It is argued that conservatism 
can decrease the agency costs in both debt and managerial contracts, which arises from the 
fact that the inside contractor has more information than the outside contractor, which 
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induces deadweight agency costs. Firms can also employ accounting conservatism to 
achieve tax benefits. Taxes are deferred for a period by accelerating expenses and 
deferring current and future gains. By decreasing the current year tax expense, firms can 
increase their firm value (Watts, 2003a). Finally, standard setters have an incentive to 
allow accounting conservatism in financial reporting despite the fact the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has supported standards that favor "unbiased" 
reporting of gains and losses which conflict with the conservatism principle (Watts, 
2003a). Criticism, plus the higher political costs associated with banning conservatism, is 
why standard-setting bodies should support accounting conservatism; although this rarely 
is the case. In short, Watts (2003a) concludes that accounting conservatism is essential to 
financial reporting and standard setters in that it attempts to limit overcompensation of 
management and increase the verifiability of earnings. 
In the conservatism literature, numerous methods for measunng accounting 
conservatism have been developed. A research paper by Wang et al. (2009) investigates 
five of the most commonly used and most effective ways of measuring accounting 
conservatism: (1) Basu' s ( 1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure, (2) Ball and 
Shivakumar's (2005) asymmetrical-cash-flow-to-accruals measure, (3) the commonly 
accepted market-to-book or the book-to-market ratio as investigated by Beaver and Ryan 
(2000), (4) Penman and Zhang's (2002) hidden reserves measures, and (5) Givoly and 
Hayn's (2000) negative-accruals measure. In addition, there are also the asymmetric 
persistence of gains and losses measures used by Basu (1997) and the new firm-specific 
measure of conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009) titled C-Score which is a 
firm-specific deviation from the classic Basu (1997) model of asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings measure. 
The research by Penman and Zhang (2002) investigates the market' reaction to 
conservatism accounting. Using their well known hidden reserves measures of accounting 
conservatism, they find that investors systematically under-react to the earnings of a 
highly conservative form, apparently ignoring the fact the earnings under a high degree of 
conservatism will likely increase in the future due to the reversal of hidden reserves. This 
research is a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis because it assumes that the 
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investors are not able to see through the distorting effect of accounting conservatism on 
the time-series property of earnings. 
While the areas of the value relevance of special items and accounting conservatism 
have been heavily researched individually, there has been little research that explains the 
relationship between those two strands of research. One currently published paper that 
does address the connection between conservatism and value relevance in general is that 
by Balachandran and Mohanram (2011 ). However, this research is not specifically on 
special items. A study which tangentially discusses the implication of accounting 
conservatism for special items, in the context of connecting special items, goodwill, and 
CEO compensations, was Saito (2011). While not being the main focus of the Saito 
(2011) paper, the author does however mention that nonrecurring items are more timely 
representations of bad news than good news, as consistent with Basu ( 1997) and Watts 
(2003b), among others. However, different from our research, Saito's measure of 
accounting conservatism is of the unconditional type as proposed by Beaver and Ryan 
(2000). She does not apply any measures of conditional conservatism as I do in this paper 
(i.e. the Khan and Watts C-Score). 
3. Hypotheses development and empirical design 
Prior research in accounting conservatism has shown that conservatism is characterized by 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In particular, earnings under conservatism involve 
a more timely reflection of bad news than good news, as shown in the following graph. 
Therefore, when an accounting gain is observed in earnings, the economic news that 
generated such a gain has already happened prior to the reporting of earnings. 
Conversely, when an accounting loss is reported, the economic news that generated the 
loss is more likely to occur in roughly the same period in which the earnings are reported, 
or shortly before that. 
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� ,. � ,. Negative Earnings 
"Bad News" 
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For example, a piece of land gains market value in the first two years due to external 
market conditions. However according to US GAAP, the value of land is always carried as 
historical cost throughout the first two years, as revaluations is prohibited.2 When the land 
is sold at the beginning of the third year at a price higher than the historical cost, a realized 
accounting gain is recognized in earnings, which is a positive special item. Because the 
stock price has already increased in response to the land price appreciation in the first two 
years, the stock price would not change much at the sales, which means that the stock 
price reaction to the sale of land at the beginning of the third year is zero. In other words, 
the earnings response coefficient for the positive special item reported in year three should 
be zero or very close to zero. 
Conversely, if the firm's land value decreased in the first two years, accounting 
standards will force an impairment charge in those two years, and nothing at the third year 
- the year of the sale. Hence, the impairment charges, which are negative special items, 
will coincide in timing with the decreases of stock prices in the first two years. Thus, there 
would be a positive correlation between stock returns and the negative special items in the 
2 For IFRS, the rule al lows the firm to revalue its Property, Plan and Equipment, but the gain should be 
reported in the statement of comprehensive income rather than in the income statement. So sti II, one cannot 
report the gain in the first two years in earnings. 
- 14 -
first two years. Therefore, the earnings response coefficient for these negative special 
items is likely positive and large in magnitude. By comparing the zero (or near zero) 
earnings response coefficient of positive special items with the large and positive earnings 
response coefficient of negative special items, it is clear that there is an asymmetry 
between the market valuation (as measured by ERC) of positive and negative special items 
due to accounting conservatism. 
Another common type of negative special item is restructuring charges. Generally 
speaking, firms have the tendency to recognize restructuring charges sooner than later, to 
the extent that accounting standard setters have to lay down strict rules regarding 
restructuring charges in order to prevent "big bath" accounting. This, however, does show 
that negative restructuring charges are generally speaking quite timely, and therefore 
contain more information content than positive special items. 
Therefore, I predict that the following phenomena would happen: 
1) Positive special items will have a much delayed recognition in earnings than negative 
special items, and therefore when a positive special item is reported in earnings the 
economic news associated with it would had already been incorporated in stock prices 
in prior periods. In contrast, negative special items are more timely recognitions of 
current economic news, which will be incorporated into the current period's stock 
pnces. 
2) The longer the period between the original economic event and the subsequent earnings 
release, the less information content is the earnings release, because the longer time 
period would enable the investors to gain more information about the nature and 
quantity of the economic event through other non-earnings means. For example, 
investors would learn more about the event through management's public disclosures, 
product information, marketing information, competitors, insider leaks, and financial 
analysts. As a result, the information in the subsequent earnings release pertaining to 
that economic event would be substantially preempted by those other information 
sources. Since good economic news results in more delayed earnings recognition 
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compared to bad economic news, it is likely that the information about the good news 
would be substantially conveyed to the market before the earnings release, leading to 
low incremental information content of the gain. Conversely, the accounting loss would 
contain more incremental information content than the gain since it is close to the 
original event time-wise. 
Because of the above two phenomena, I expect negative special items to have more 
market valuation impact than positive special items, which leads to my first set of 
hypotheses: 
Hla: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for negative special items is 
significantly positive. 
Hlb: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for positive special items is not 
significantly different than zero. 
Because the gains are recognized later in earnings than are compounded into stock prices, 
the value relevance of such gains is significantly smaller, even negative, to investors 
because they already are aware of the special item gain and discounted the firm value as 
such in previous quarters. 
Figure 2: Market valuation of special items subject to conservatism 
Normal reporting 
" 







Posit ve SI 
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- 16 -
Additionally, as firm reports more conservatively, the value relevance of negative 
special items increases making the slope of the "more conservative reporting line" more 
steep (increasing) than the "normal reporting" line. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is more profound if the degree 
of accounting conservatism is higher in a firm. The next question would be in which 
direction the asymmetry is traveling in response to an increase in accounting 
conservatism. It is my opinion that the value relevance of negative special items will 
increase (and become positive) as conservatism levels rises, because the earlier 
recognition of gains implies negative economic events(i.e. bad news) will almost 
instantaneously impact on both stock prices and earnings. Conversely, when conservatism 
increases, gains are further delayed, the stock returns would not respond much to the 
earnings, as it contains very little new information, which causes the ERC for gains to 
decrease to an insignificant level. This finding is consistent with previous special item 
value relevance papers that exclude positive special items due to a lack of explanatory 
power (Black et al., 1999; Cready et al., 201 O; Elliott and Hanna, 1996; Francis et al., 
1996) Hence, I have the following hypothesis: 
H2a: The earnings response coefficient (ERC) for negative special items is 
increasing in the degree of accounting conservatism. 
Naturally, I will investigate how conservatism influences the differential ERC between 
positive and negative special items, which leads to the final hypothesis as below: 
H2b: The asymmetry between the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for 




The sample used a combination of Compustat and CRSP quarterly data over the nine 
years period between 2000 and 2009. The selection of raw sample was determined by 
excluding ADR firms and firms in the financial sector. To decrease survivorship bias, both 
inactive and current active firms are included in the raw sample. Following the common 
practice, the raw sample data was then trimmed according to the top and bottom 1 % of 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), special items divided by book value of equity 
(SI 1 ), earnings (X), abnormal return (ABRET), size, leverage (LEV), and market-to-book 
ratio (MTB). Furthermore, in order to concentrate on positive and negative special items, 
we delete those firm-year observations whose value of special item is zero. 
SUE is calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items in the 
present quarter t less special items and the lagged earnings of t-4 less special items divided 
by the quarterly book value of equity for t-4. Size is defined as the natural log of the 
market value of equity. Leverage is calculated as the total of short-term (Compustat item 
#34) and long-term debt (Compustat item #9) scaled by the market value of equity. The 
size and leverage equations used were defined in the research paper by Khan and Watts 
(2009). Earnings (X) are calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
item # 18) in the current quarter divided by the market value of equity (Compustat item 
MKVL T) of four quarters prior (t-4). 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the definition by Cready et al. (2010) which 
states that ABRET is equal to quarterly market-adjusted stock return for a firm 
accumulated over the period from one trading day after the previous quarter's (t-1) 
earnings release date through the earnings release date of the current quarter (t). The 
variable abnormal return is not immediately collectable from a database. Instead, I 
collected the earnings release dates from Compustat which vary between firms, and even 
within in each firm between quarters. Then I used the CRSP database to collect daily firm 
return indexes from 1998-2008, and used CUSIP numbers from Compustat and CRSP to 
run a program to match the firm date to its respective daily return with a MySQL database. 
Furthermore, I also collected the market daily return indexes for 1998-2008 and merged 
the respective date for each earnings release date to the main dataset. Once I collected the 
firm specific return and associated market return, I calculated the abnormal return by 
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taking the difference between firm index returns and market index returns over each 
earnings announcement window for each firm-quarter. 
After the above trimming procedure and deleting observations with missing values in 
any of the variables, the final sample is consisted of 32, 160 firm-quarters ranging from 
years 2000 to 2009. The descriptive statistics for this dataset are displayed in Table 1. The 
mean (median) of special item scaled by the beginning quarter equity for the sample is -
0.019 (-0.004), indicating that most special items are negative, which is consistent with the 
findings in the prior literature (Elliot and Hanna 1996, Francis et al. 1996). The mean 
(median) values for SUE, ABRET, and C_SCORE are 0.005 (0.004), 0.006 (-0.005), and 
0.000 (0.001), respectively. Note that C_SCORE is the firm-specific measure of 
accounting conservatism used developed by Khan and Watts (2009). This measure is 
discussed in the following section. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix used for this quarterly sample of data. The 
top right corner of the matrix is the Pearson correlations while the lower left hand corner 
is the Spearman rank correlations. The Pearson (Spearman) correlations for special items 
and C-Score are -0.049 (-0.072) indicating that as the level of conservatism increases, its 
correlation with special items decreases. Abnormal returns and C-Score have a positive 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.017 (-0.075) indicating that increasing conservatism 
levels results in larger abnormal returns. The relationship between special items and 
abnormal returns has the indication of a positive relationship due to a positive correlation 
coefficient of 0.062 (0.063). 
5. Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1 C-Score measure of accounting conservatism 
I will test my hypotheses using a firm-year-specific measure of accounting 
conservatism called C-Score (Khan and Watts, 2009). It is imperative that the measure of 
accounting conservatism is firm-year-specific in this study. This criterion eliminates the 
use of the popular Basu (1997) measure as it is not firm-specific. The Penman and 
Zhang's hidden-reserves measure of accounting conservatism, although being firm­
specific, is not used in this study because it has a higher data requirement than other 
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measures. 3 In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the functionality and calculation of 
the C-Score measures in detail. 
The measure of conservatism adopted in this paper is the C-Score measure developed 
by Khan and Watts (2009). The C-Score measure is an extension of the asymmetric 
timeliness concept by Basu (1997) which is applied in a firm-year-specific context. 
Unlike the original Basu model, C-Score uses three instrumental variables - firm size, 
MTB ratio, and leverage levels - which have been empirically proven to vary with 
conservatism levels, to allow for Basu-type measure of conservatism on a firm-year level 
(Khan and Watts, 2009). Broadly speaking, C-score is a measure of "conditional" 
conservatism because it incorporates the idea of asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
The variables selected to be used in the C-Score calculation were deliberately chosen 
due to the fact that they incorporate the four main factors that cause changes in 
conservatism as defined by Watts (2003a): contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation. 
The variables of MTB, size, and leverage are all affected by the firm's investment 
opportunity set thus using them in the equation for C-Score should ideally capture 
fluctuations in conservatism levels (Khan and Watts, 2009). Following Khan and Watts 
(2009), to calculate C-Score, the following cross-sectional regression is run each year over 
the ten years from 1999 to 2009: 
Xi = /30 + /31Di + Ri(µ0 + µ1SIZEi + µ2MTBi + µ3LEVi) 
+ DiRi0-o + .A1SIZEi + .A2MTBi + .A3LEVi) 
+ (o0SIZEi + o1MTBi + o2LEVi + o3DiSIZEi + o4DiMTBi + o5DiLEVi) 
Where 
X : yearly earnings 
D : dummy variable defined as I if R<O and 0 if R>O 
R : yearly firm returns 
SIZE : size of the firm calculated by the natural log of the market value of equity 
(1) 
3 The Penman and Zhang (2002) measure of conservatism requires available data on R&D expenses and 
advertising expenses, which are mostly missing from the Compustat database. If we adopt this measure, we 
would have to sacrifice too much data . 
- 20 -
MTB : the market-to-book ratio 
LEV : firm leverage calculated by the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled 
by the market value of equity 
The results of the regression (1) are summarized in Table 3. The coefficients are the 
mean coefficients from the regressions for the years from 1999 to 2009. Following the 
Fama-MacBeth procedure, the t-statistic is calculated as each mean coefficients divided by 
its respective standard deviations. These coefficients are then used to calculate CS for 
each firm over the time horizon by the following equation: 
The results of the CS calculation can be found in Table 3 and the descriptive statistics 
table in the appendix. Once calculated, the values were added to the dataset in order to 
later be used in the ERC regression models as an independent variable. 
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 
In order to test the Hl, which predicts that the ERC for negative special items is 




ABRET : the abnormal return is the quarterly market-adjusted stock return per firm 
collected over the period of one day after the earnings announcement date 
for the prior quarter (t-1) through the earnings announcement date for the 
current quarter. 
SUE : the standardized unexpected earnings 
Sii : the special items reported in each quarter divided by beginning book value of 
equity 
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The above regression model is adapted from Elliott and Hanna ( 1996) and Cready et 
al. (2010), which test how well abnormal stock returns are explained by the standard SUE 
variable, as well as equity-scaled special items (SI I). Elliott and Hanna (1996) argue that 
the ERC on special items (SI 1) is smaller than that on normal earnings, which is proxied 
for by SUE, because special items are less persistent than normal earnings. Regression (2) 
allows two separate ERCs for positive and negative special items by separating the dataset 
into negative and positive special items and running the regression separately for each 
subset. The difference between negative and positive special items' ERC is captured by 
the coefficient 82• Hypothesis la implies that 82 should be significantly greater than zero 
for negative special items and hypothesis I b states that 82 is not significantly different 
from zero for positive special items. 
The actual result of estimating regression (2) with the sample data is reported in Table 
4. The ERC Ct-statistic) for negative special items 82 is 0.103 (4.567) and significant at 
I% level. As predicted, the ERC for positive special items ( 82) is 0.066 (0. 779) and not 
statistically significant. These results are highly consistent with Hypotheses I a and I b. 
5.3 Test of Hypothesis 2 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b which argue that the ERC of positive and negative 
special items and the difference between them are changing as the degree of accounting 
conservatism increases, Regression model (3) is estimated separately for positive and 
negative special items, as follows: 
where 
A BRET : the abnormal return is the quarterly market-adjusted stock return per 
firm collected over the period of one day after the earnings 
announcement date for the prior quarter (t-1) through the earnings 
announcement date for the current quarter. 




: the special items reported in each quarter divided by beginning book 
value of equity 
: the C-score conservatism measure for each firm 
According to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, I predict the following: 
First, for negative special items, (34, which is the interaction effect between negative 
special items and C-Score on abnormal returns, will be positive and significant. This 
positive (34 indicates that as the degree of conservatism (i.e. C-score) increases, the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) of negative special items also increases. 
Second, for positive special items, {34, which is the interaction effect between positive 
special items and C-Score on abnormal returns, will be negative, but not significantly 
different from zero. The two values of {34, for negative and positive special items 
respectively, are significantly different from each other. Thus, the /34 for negative special 
items minus the /34 for positive special items would be significantly positive. In other 
words, when the degree of conservatism increases the asymmetry between the ERCs for 
negative and positive special items gets bigger. 
The empirical results of estimation Regression (3) can be found in Table 5. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2a, I found that the earnings response coefficient is significantly 
increasing for negative special items as the degree of conservatism increases (/34 = 20.992, 
t-stat = 3.095). By comparison, the interaction effect between positive special items and 
C-Score (the proxy for conservatism) for abnormal return is negative (/34 = -25.640, t­
stat= -1.066), although not significantly, which indicates that the earnings response 
coefficient on positive special items is only weakly decreasing with the degree of 
accounting conservatism. 
It is observable that the value of the coefficient (34 is relatively large. This is due to the 
fact that the C-Score values are quite small for the majority of firms. In this case, perhaps 
the t-statistic is a better indicator for the strength of the effects of C-Score on the earnings 
response coefficient of special items. Lastly, it can be easily determined that the difference 
between these two coefficients is 20.992 - (-25.640) = 46.632, which is also statistically 
significant at the 5% according to a pooled-sample t statistic. 
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In summary of Section 5, my empirical results are consistent with the theoretical 
hypotheses using C-Score as a measure of accounting conservatism. The empirical 
evidence show that as the level of conservatism increases, the earnings response 
coefficient for positive special is not significantly different from zero, or irrelevant, 
indicating that for a very conservative firm, the gains reported as special items do not 
provide much value relevant information to the stock market. Conversely, the opposite is 
found for negative special items. Because accounting losses reported as negative special 
items, such as impairment charges and restructuring charges, are more timely reported, 
they tend to contain more value relevant information to investors. In addition, because of 
the short interval between the underlying economic event and the reporting of negative 
special items, stock returns and the earnings are more likely to be in the same period, 
which further increases the earnings response coefficient of negative special items. 
6. An Alternative Explanation 
While the result of regression (3) is consistent with Hypothesis 2, which is based on 
the rationale that accounting conservatism leads to a lower information content in positive 
special items than in negative special items, the empirical result is also consistent with an 
alternative explanation: the ERC for negative special items may be greater than the ERC 
for positive special items because negative special items may be more persistent than 
positive ones. Although this alternative explanation is just as justified by the results of 
regression (2), it however cannot easily explain the empirical findings of regression (3) 
which gives evidence of the strong relationship between accounting conservatism and the 
market valuation of special items. 
I would like to point out that the alternative explanation that the asymmetry between 
the ERC of positive and negative special items is due to the different levels of earnings 
persistence is inconsistent with my regressions (3a,b ) . These two regressions clearly show 
a strong link between ERC and the degree of conservatism, but do not address the 
relationship between ERC and earnings persistence. In fact, according the Basu (1997) 
paper, the more conservative a firm is, the less persistent its accounting losses are relative 
to gains. This would mean that the negative special items would have lower earnings 
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response coefficient than would positive special items. This is clearly refuted by the 
empirical evidence presented in this paper. 
The persistence and frequency of reporting special items is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it does leave room for additional research in the future on the 
asymmetric value relevance of accounting conservatism and persistence levels in regards 
to special item market valuation. I propose additional research on the topic of value 
relevance, using ERC tests, between frequency and persistence of special items and 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, I plan to test how this explanatory variable compares to 
this research on accounting conservatism as an explanation and run empirical tests to 
determine the difference between the two and determine which occurrence has the greater 
affect and thus more value to investors. 
7. Conclusions and limitations 
This paper offers theoretical and empirical evidence that the asymmetrical valuation of 
negative and positive special items can be, at least partially, explained by accounting 
conservatism. In particular, I examine how earning response coefficients (ERC) of both 
positive and negative special items respond to different levels of accounting conservatism. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, empirical tests illustrate that as levels of accounting 
conservatism increase, negative special items' ERC increases while positive special items' 
ERC decreases to a point of insignificance to investors. Therefore, it is likely that 
investors are valuing nonrecurring losses more highly than nonrecurring gains because 
accounting conservatism makes nonrecurring losses more timely, and thus more useful to 
investors, than nonrecurring gains. Thus, I conclude that conservatism is likely an 
important factor that influences the market valuation of special items. 
This paper fills in the gap in the literature by linking the valuation of special items and 
conservatism. Most prior research on special items research typically discard positive 
special items from their samples, acknowledging a lack of value relevance for positive 
special items and disregards them all together from their empirical studies; this research, 
however, contributes to the literature by analyzing as to why a discrepancy in valuation 
coefficients exists between nonrecurring gains and losses. By doing so, this research 
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explicitly links value relevance research and accounting conservatism research, which not 
only has significant explanatory power for the valuation coefficient of special items but 
also has implications for other types of accounting earnings. The latter topic can be 
addressed in future research. 
This paper has the following limitations: First, our research utilizes only one, albeit a 
strongly supported, measure for accounting conservatism - the Khan and Watts (2009) C­
Score - which may not be the proxy that all researchers would agree to use to measure 
conservatism. The topic of measuring accounting conservatism has been the subject of 
intense debate recently and no conclusion as to the best measure of conservatism has yet 
been reached. Second, this paper does not address the issue of how the frequency of 
special items impacts on their value relevance. Incorporating the frequency issue into our 
paper would significantly raise the complexity and scope of the present paper, which is 
best left to future research. Third, by focusing on special items alone, this paper does not 
address how the value relevance of other types of earnings would interact with accounting 
conservatism. Doing that would take us much further outside the scope of the present 
study. But this is nevertheless a useful research topic to study in the future. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Media n Std. Dev Ql Q3 
N I  19 .406 2 .084 1 5 1 . 689 -3 .065 19 .646 
A BRET 0. 006 -0. 005 0. 204 -0. 1 15 0. 108 
S i l  -0.019 -0.004 0.056 -0.018 0.000 
SALES 609. 370 131. 650 1594.621 30.980 480.250 
TL 1703 .000 281 .400 4449 .755 48.650 1 188.000 
TA 273 2.000 610. 700 6382.411 1 5 3 . 000 2 2 10.000 
MV 3 2 24. 860 862 . 7 3 2  6352 . 394 242.541 2862. 574 
ROE -4.907 5 . 538 235.091 -8.481 1 3 .852 
ROI -6.417 3 . 3 57 64.430 - 5 . 6 34 8.801 
EQU ITY 1028.660 285 . 160 2243.954 8 2 . 5 10 9 1 1 . 850 
EAR N I NGS 19.371 2 . 154 1 2 2 .076 - 2 . 8 1 8  19.255 
S U E  0.005 0 . 004 0.090 -0.015 0.022 
MTB 4.297 1 .976 134.495 1 . 240 3 . 2 6 1  
PRICE 24.300 14. 500 503.334 6 . 3 8 1  26.920 
SI - 1 1 . 1 1 8  - 1 .000 7 9 . 2 6 6  -5.758 -0.010 
C_SCO R E  0.000 0.001 0 .003 -0.001 0.002 
This tab le shows the descriptive statistics for a total of 32, 1 60 firm-years ranging from 2000 to 2009. The 
mean, median, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), first (Q I )  and third (Q3) quartiles are reported . N I  is annual 
net income. ABRET is the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from one trad ing day after the 
earnings announcement date for the prior quarter (t- 1 )  through the earn ings announcement date for the 
current quarter (t). SI is special items as defined by Compustat. SI I is special items scaled by the book 
value of equity. Sales are the quarterly sales for the firms.  TL is total l iabi l ities or  debt. TA is total assets. 
MY is market value of equity. ROE is return on equity. ROI is return on investment. Equity is the average 
of book value of firm equity. Earnings are income before extraordinary items (Compustat data item #8). 
Price is the closing stock price on the last day of the quarter averaged for total of examined firms from 2000-
2009 . S U E  is defined as the difference between earnings in quarter t less special items and earnings in 
quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly book value of equity in  quarter t-4. MTB is  market-to­
book rat io .  C-Score is a firm-specific conservatism measure as created by Khan and Watts (2009). 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
N I  A BRET SI SALE TL TA MV ROE ROI EQU ITY EARN SUE MTB PRICE cs 
N I  0.055 0.196 0.451 0.452 0.498 0.613 0.039 0. 129 0.519 0.957 0.120 0.002 0 . 147 -0.161 
A BRET 0. 139 0.062 0.012 0.019 0.022 0.058 0.029 0.055 0.024 0.055 0.075 -0.004 0.050 0.017 
SI 0.339 0.063 0.041 0.032 0.045 0.060 0.046 0.228 0.064 0.204 -0.014 -0.078 0.061 -0.049 
SALES 0. 585 0.078 0.076 0 . 7 19 0.735 0.636 0.029 0.095 0. 674 0.461 0.002 -0.005 0. 148 -0.282 
TL 0 . 5 1 3  0.075 0.060 0 . 9 2 1  0.977 0 .710 0.030 0.079 0.814 0.449 0.006 -0.004 0. 1 34 -0. 362 
TA 0.552 0.080 0.096 0.930 0.972 0.786 0.030 0.090 0.920 0.498 0.007 -0.007 0.149 -0.368 
MV 0.625 0 . 1 19 0.123 0. 844 0.852 0.914 0.044 0. 144 0.828 0.623 0.033 0.003 0.215 -0. 340 
ROE 0.692 0 . 1 2 1  0 . 2 29 0.481 0.401 0.423 0.513 0.101 0.026 0.040 -0.008 -0.031 0.027 -0.030 
ROI 0.673 0. 1 1 5  0.245 0.444 0 . 3 28 0.373 0.492 0 .950 0.099 0.133 0.042 -0. 030 0 . 1 2 6  -0. 150 
EQU ITY 0.570 0.083 0. 147 0.879 0.871 0.954 0 .920 0.422 0.408 0.525 0.009 -0.012 0.157 -0.332 
EARN 0.970 0. 141 0.345 0. 594 0.519 0.557 0.629 0.706 0.686 0.573 0 . 1 26 0.002 0 . 1 5 1  -0. 1 67 
S U E  0 . 2 5 1  0.141 -0.053 0.071 0.052 0.046 0. 101 0. 188 0.175 0.037 0.259 0.040 0.022 0 .011 
MTB 0.282 0 . 1 27 0.017 0.082 0. 105 0.084 0.366 0 .364 0. 344 0.025 0.281 0.040 0.003 -0. 004 
PRICE 0.592 0 . 1 50 0. 148 0.653 0.627 0.664 0.755 0. 600 0.591 0.670 0.597 -0.606 0.377 -0.133 
C_SCORE -0.468 -0.075 -0.072 -0.695 -0.720 -0.750 -0.781 -0.416 -0.393 -0.7 2 3  -0.477 -0.071 -0.297 -0. 606 
The tab le shows the means of cross-sectional correlations for 32,  1 60 firm-years from 2000-2009. The upper right triangle of the matrix is the Pearson 
correlations. The bottom left triangle is the Spearman correlations. NI is annual net income. ABRET is the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from 
one trading day after the earnings announcement date for the prior quarter (t- 1 )  through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). SI is special 
items as defined by Compustat scaled by the book value of equity. Sales are the quarterly sales for the firms. TL is total l iab i l ities or debt. TA is total assets. 
MV is market value of equity. ROE is return on equity. ROI is return on investment. Equity is  the average of book value of firm equity at quarter-end. Price is 
the closing stock price on the last day of the quarter averaged for total of examined firms from 2000-2009 . SUE is defined as the difference between earnings in 
quarter t less special items and earnings in quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly book value of equity in quarter t-4. MTB is  market-to-book ratio. 
C-Score is a firm-specific conservatism measure as created by Khan and Watts (2009). 
Table 3: C score regression using Fama-MacBath procedure 
Xi = {30 + {J1Di + Ri(µ0 + µ15/ZEi + µ2MTBi + µ3LEVi) 
+ Di Ri(}i ..0 + }.15/ZEi + A2MTBi + }.3LEVJ 
+ (805/ZEi + o1MTBi + o2LEVi + o3DiSIZEi + o4DiMTBi + o5DiLEVi) 
+ Ei 




RET x S IZE 
RET x MTB 
RET x LEV 
D x RETURN 
D x RET x SIZE 
D x RET x MTB 




D x S IZE 
D x MTB 








-0. 2 1 3 7  -1.7779 
-0.0263 -0. 2480 
-0.0029 - 1 . 5678 
0.0004 1 . 3 245 
0.0000 0.4284 
0 .0001 0.0965 
0.0062 2 . 5487 
-0.0009 - 1 . 9 7 6 1  
0.0000 -0.4026 
0.0000 -0.0100 
0.0377 2 . 1 5 2 2  
-0.0009 -0.2 245 
-0.0678 -0.9259 
0.0026 0 . 1 694 
0.0013 0 . 33 8 2  
0 . 0 1 1 3  0.1862 
This table shows the mean coefficients from annual regressions of earnings on the variables l i sted above from 
1 999-2009 which includes 5 1 ,300 firm years. D is a control variable which is equal to I if R ETURN is 
negative and 0 if  RETURN is positive. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity. MTB is market­
to-book ratio .  LEV is leverage which is calculated by the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by 
market value of equity. These variables were originally used in the paper by Khan and Watts (2009). 




S il  
I ntercept 
S U E  
S i l  
ABRETit = (}0 + f} 1SUEit + fJ2S/1it + cit 
Pred . Sign Coeff. 




0 . 1 2 7  
0.066 








4 . 8 1 1  
0 . 7 7 9  
2 . 657 
14. 3 3 2  
4 . 567 
Sign if. 
* * *  
* * *  
* *  
* * *  
* * *  
This table shows the regression coefficients, basic t-statistics, and the s ignificance levels for hypothesis 1 .  The 
data used is from the Compustat database and covers 32,  1 60 firm years ranging from 2000-2009. ABRET is 
the quarterly-adjusted stock return accumulated from one trading day after the earnings announcement date for 
the prior quarter (t- 1 )  through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). S I  1 is defined as 
special items scaled by the book value of equity in the same quarter. SUE is defined as the d i fference between 
earnings in quarter t less special items and earnings in quarter t-4 less special items scaled by the quarterly 
book value of equity in quarter t-4. D is a control variable that stipulates that if S I<O, it wi l l  equal I otherwise 
the value is equal to 0. The sign ificance code for this table is as fol lows: ' * * * '  for 0 .0 1 ,  ' * * ' for 0 .05 ,  and ' * '  
0. 1 0. 
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Table 5: Regressing abnormal returns on SUE and C-score 





C_SCO R E  




C_SCOR E  
Sil :  C_SCORE 
Pred . Sign Coeff. 
Positive Special Items {Sl>O) 
0.017 
+ 0 . 1 2 6  
+/- 0 .080 
2 .017 
-25.640 
Negative Special Items {Sl<O) 
0.003 




t-stat. Sign if. 
6 . 2 2 2  * * *  
4.790 * * *  
0. 897 
2 . 294 * 
- 1 . 06 6  
2 . 20 1  * 
14 . 354 * * *  
3 . 2 5 1  * *  
-4.022 * * *  
3 . 09 5 * *  
This table shows the coefficients from the regression that tests the conservatism measure of C-Score i n  a 
valuation equation designed for special items .  The test is separated by sign of special items. The data used is 
from the Compustat database and covers 32, 1 60 firm years ranging from 2000-2009. ABRET is the quarterly­
adjusted stock return accumulated from one trading day after the earnings announcement date for the prior 
quarter (t- 1 )  through the earnings announcement date for the current quarter (t). S 1 1  is defined as special items 
scaled by the book value of equity in the same quarter. SUE is defined as the difference between earnings in 
quarter (t) less special items and earnings in quarter (t-4) less special items scaled by the quarterly book value of 
equity in quarter (t-4). C-Score is a firm-specific conservative measure designed by Khan and Watts (2009). 
The s ignificance code for thi s  table is as follows: ' * * * '  for 0.0 1 ,  ' * * ' for 0.05, and ' * '  0 . 1 0 . 
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